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The Food Safety Modernization Act of
2011:
Too Little, Too Broad, Too Bad
Nicholas Obolensky*
I. INTRODUCTION
The common expression "you are what you eat" is a fitting
adage that presents a significant concern when one considers the
evolution of food production from family farms to factory farms,
and the large agri-businesses that currently supply the majority of
American food. Human beings rely on food for sustenance and
nutrition, and our health and well-being is dependent on the
vitality of the food we consume. Increasing reliance on industrial
methods of producing and distributing food threatens our health,
nutrition, environment, and culture. Traditionally, local farms
produced the food Americans consumed and, for the most part,
people ate local, seasonal food. People did not question whether
food was "organic" or not because the concept did not exist.' All
* Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law 2012. The author
would like to express his deep gratitude to his wife Alexandra for her
unwavering support, endless patience, and thoughtful insights she provided
during the writing of this article and throughout his law school career.
Additionally, the author would like to extend a special thanks to Professor
Michael Burger for his support, guidance, and constructive criticism.
1. The word "organic," referring to an agricultural practice, was first
used by Lord Northbourne when he coined the term "organic farming" in his
1940 book Look to the Land to contrast organic with chemical farming. John
Paull, The Farm as Organism: The Foundational Idea of Organic Agriculture,
83 ELEMENTALS: J. BIO-DYNAMICs TAS. 14, 14 (2006), available at
http://orgprints.org/10138.
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food was organic. Over the course of the 20th century, as the
nation transitioned from the predominately agricultural society of
the 19th century to an industrial nation with an urbanized
population, there was a dramatic shift in the method of food
production. 2
In response to the growing demand of the newly urbanized
population, food production shifted away from local production
and processing, and toward more industrial processing and
national marketing. 3  Food manufacturers met this growing
demand by adopting similar techniques to those utilized by the
industrial sector.4  Various technologies and chemicals were
developed to sustain this new, streamlined, mega-farm, assembly-
line method of food production.5 The evils inherent in this new
food production system first became publicly apparent with
respect to the "appalling and grossly unsanitary working
conditions in meat packing factories" when Upton Sinclair
published his book The Jungle.6  Following this shocking
revelation, the legislature responded by enacting the Pure Food
and Drug Act (PFDA) and the Meat Inspection Act (MIA) in 1906,
thus establishing the initial U.S. food safety statutory
framework.
A few decades later, upon recognizing a need to further
develop the food safety regulatory framework and provide for
direct government oversight, Congress passed the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C) in 1938. The FD&C expanded
the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) power to regulate food
safety by authorizing inspections, adding authority for
injunctions, setting tolerance levels for dangerous substances, and
requiring labeling standards. 9 Since its inception, the FD&C has
2. See Chenglin Liu, The Obstacles of Outsourcing Imported Food
Safety to China, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249, 253 (2010).
3. Sandra Hoffmann & William Harder, Food Safety and Risk
Governance in Globalized Markets, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 5 (2010).




8. Id. at 254-55.
9. Shannon G. May, Importing a Change in Diet: The Proposed Food
Safety Law of 2010 and the Possible Impact on Importers and International
Trade, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 4 (2010).
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been amended over thirty times, each addition either providing
more detailed food production and marketing requirements or
granting more authority to federal agencies for implementing
safety standards.' 0
Recently, several Jungle-like revelations have once again
shocked the nation. For example, a 2006 E. coli H7 outbreak first
recognized by a scientist in Wisconsin and characterized as "one of
the largest and deadliest in the country," caused 3 deaths, 204
illnesses, and 104 hospitalizations in 26 states." A salmonella
outbreak in 2008, initially associated with certain types of
tomatoes, cost the tomato industry an estimated $200 million,
although jalapeno peppers were later discovered to have been the
contaminated source.12  Shortly after, a much more severe
salmonella outbreak, causing 9 deaths and 660 illnesses, was
traced back to two processing plants owned by the Peanut
Corporation of America (PCA) in Georgia and Texas.13 The most
shocking aspect of the peanut-related salmonella outbreak was
not that it cost the industry over one billion dollars, but that the
PCA plant in Georgia had been inspected nine times between 2006
and 2008 by state officials under agreement with the FDA, and no
action was taken to remedy the abysmal conditions and safety
violations they noted.14 In response to this peanut scandal, as
well as growing public concern about imported food safety due to
melamine tainted pet foods from China,' 5 Congress decided to put
food safety at the top of its legislative agenda. 16
The result, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA),
passed by Congress on December 21, 2010, and signed into law by
President Obama on January 4, 2011, is the focus of this article.' 7
10. Id.
11. Sara M. Benson, Guidance for Improving the Federal Response to
Foodborne Illness Outbreaks Associated with Fresh Produce, 65 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 503, 508-09 (2010).
12. Id. at 510.
13. Rena Steinzor, High Crimes, Not Misdemeanors: Deterring the
Production of Unsafe Food, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 175, 176 (2010).
14. See id. at 177-78.
15. See Liu, supra note 2, at 251.
16. Steinzor, supra note 13, at 179.
17. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat.
3885 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). For the
purposes of this article and for clarity's sake, all citation and textual
references will be made to the sections of the FSMA session laws. This
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While there is clearly a societal need for enhanced food safety, the
FSMA is an inadequate response because it does too little to
minimize safety risks posed by large-scale food production
facilities and it does too much by imposing excessive regulatory
burdens on small and mid-sized farms and facilities." The
comprehensive scheme of the FS1IA essentially imposes one-size-
fits-all, across-the-board regulations with little regard to the scale
of the individual operations, even though "[a]ll of the well-
publicized incidents of contamination in recent years ... occurred
in industrialized food supply chains that span national and even
international boundaries."1 9 Small and mid-sized farms and food
production facilities do not pose the same risks because of the
inherent transparency and accountability accompanying a closer
proximal relationship to consumers' food supply.
Conscious of this apparent discrepancy in scale, legislators
sought to mitigate potential harms by providing an exemption for
small food facilities in the Tester-Hagan Amendment. This highly
controversial amendment, ultimately adopted in the final form of
the FS1A, 20 does indeed contemplate the discrepancy, but is,
unfortunately, too limited in scope, and is undermined by too
much agency discretion. The FS1A falls short of achieving its
goal for improved food safety because its application to large food
production facilities, the primary sources of food-borne illnesses,
barely improves the status quo and the requirements imposed on
smaller farms and facilities that do not qualify for an exemption
under the Tester-Hagan Amendment are a significant impediment
citation method is used to allow the reader to hone in directly on the FSMA's
language and more efficiently consider this note's arguments, without
needing to differentiate the new FSMA language from the pre-existing FD&C
language within the U.S. Code sections.
18. The FSMA is applicable to all food production facilities, farms, and
food operations. The main distinctions that will be made in this article are on
the basis of scale and not by the type of operation. Where a distinction is
necessary, the article will include it, but it is important to note at the outset
that, in general, FSMA section 103 relates to facilities and FSMA section 105
relates to farms. Id. at §§ 103, 105. The term facility is defined infra, note
55.
19. Margie MacDonald & Judith McGeary, S. 510 Food Safety
Modernization Act: Healthy Local Foods Amendment - Sen. Jon Tester, SMALL
HOLDERs ALLIANCE, http://smallholdersalliance.com/QA-Tester-Amendment-
April-15%20(2).pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
20. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), 105(a), §§
418(1), 419(f).
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to the viability of their operations.
In discussing how and why the FS1VIA misses its target, this
article proceeds as follows. Part II will first examine the key
provisions of the FD&C that have been amended by the FMSA,
and will then focus on the provisions included by the adoption of
the Tester-Hagan Amendment. Part III will provide an in depth
analysis of (1) the shortcomings of the FSVIA with respect to large
food production facilities, (2) the disproportionate effect it will
have on smaller farms and food production facilities, and (3) the
large role agency discretion plays in its implementation and effect
on food safety. Part IV will conclude by explaining and suggesting
the need for a shift in the role that government plays with respect
to food safety, health, and nutrition.
II. THE FDA FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT
Foodborne illness is a significant problem in the United
States as demonstrated by the 2011 Center for Disease Control
(CDC) findings that estimate "that each year roughly 1 in 6
Americans (or 48 million people) get sick, 128,000 are
hospitalized, and 3,000 die of foodborne diseases."21 In an effort to
remedy this "largely preventable" public health problem, Congress
passed the FSMA to provide the FDA with wider latitude in
combating the issue.22 The major elements of the FSMA can be
divided into the following five categories: Preventive Controls,
Inspection and Compliance, Imported Food Safety, Response, and
Enhanced Partnerships. 23
21. CDC 2011 Estimates: Findings, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.
html (last. updated Apr. 19, 2011); see also Steinzor, supra note 13, at 178
(noting higher statistics from a 1999 CDC estimate); Background on the FDA
Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm239907.htm (last
updated Mar. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Background on the FSMA]. According to
the CDC website, the higher statistics for foodborne diseases shown in the
1999 estimate largely "reflect innovations in data and methodology that have
occurred in the past decade." Data and Methodological Differences, 2011 and
1999, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
foodborneburden/differences-in-estimates.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2011).
22. Background on the FSMA, supra note 21.
23. Id.
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A. Key Provisions Established by the FSMA
1. Preventative Controls
One of the key elements of the FS1VIA is the requirement that
food production facilities develop preventative controls similar to
the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) 24 plans
already required of seafood producers, juice producers, and the
meat and poultry industry. Section 103 of the FSMA, "Hazard
Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive Controls" adds a new section
418 to the FD&C, which generally requires facilities to evaluate
potential hazards, identify and implement preventative controls to
prevent the potential hazards, monitor the performance of the
controls, and maintain records of the monitoring.25 The potential
hazards requiring analysis, implementation of controls, and
maintenance of records include: biological, chemical, physical, and
radiological hazards, natural toxins, pesticides, drug residues,
decomposition, parasites, allergens, unapproved food and color
additives, and any naturally occurring or unintentionally
introduced hazards. 26
This new requirement for developing hazard analysis and
risk-based control plans (HARCP) basically requires facilities to
identify points in their processing system that could become
potentially dangerous and then develop controls to prevent that
from occurring. 27 It also requires facilities to maintain a written
plan and documentation of their HARCP, monitor its
effectiveness, take any necessary corrective actions, and verify
that the HARCP is adequate to prevent the hazards identified.28
The plan must be made available to the FDA 29 during inspections
24. "HACCP is a management system in which food safety is addressed
through the analysis and control of biological, chemical, and physical hazards
from raw material production, procurement and handling, to manufacturing,
distribution and consumption of the finished product." Hazard Analysis &
Critical Control Points (HAACP), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/food/foodsafety/hazardanalysiscriticalcontrolpointshaccp/d
efault.htm (last updated Apr. 27, 2011).
25. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), § 418(a).
26. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(b)(1)(A)-(B).
27. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(a)-(b).
28. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(h)-(i).
29. Throughout this article when the acronym "FDA" is used it is
intended as shorthand for "The Commissioner of Food and Drugs," "The
Secretary of Health and Human Services," as well as for its traditional use as
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and must be reevaluated every three years or "whenever a
significant change is made in the activities conducted at [the]
facility."30 Section 418(1) is where the Tester-Hagan Amendment
was added to "modif[y] requirements for qualified facilities," or to
exempt certain facilities from the HARCP requirements if they
meet certain criteria, which will be discussed more fully below.3 1
Within eighteen months of the enactment of the FS1A, the FDA
is required to promulgate science-based minimum standards for
the section, define the terms "small business" and "very small
business," and "provide sufficient flexibility to be practicable for
all sizes and types of facilities."32
Produce safety is addressed in Section 105, which adds section
419 to the FD&C, and requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to establish "science-based minimum standards"
for fruit and vegetables in conjunction with the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Homeland Security, and with consideration given
to existing standards established under the Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990.33 Special priority is established for raw
fruits and vegetables that have known risks.34  The standards
must consider naturally occurring hazards, as well as those that
may be introduced either unintentionally or intentionally, and
must address materials added to the soil (e.g., compost), hygiene,
packaging, temperature controls, animals in the growing area,
and water. 35
2. Inspection and Compliance
To ensure compliance with the preventative control standards
established to improve food safety and to enable the FDA to
respond effectively to food safety problems that may arise, the
FSMA provides for increased mandatory inspection frequency,
access to records, and testing by accredited laboratories. 36 Section
201 of the FSMA, adding new section 421 to the FD&C,
an acronym for the Food and Drug Administration.
30. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), §418(i).
31. See infra at Part II.B
32. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(n)(1)-(3).
33. Id. sec. 105(a), § 419(a)(1)(A).
34. Id. sec. 105(a), § 419(a)(3).
35. Background on the FSMA, supra note 21.
36. Id.
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establishes more frequent mandatory inspections of food facilities
based on the Secretary's assessment and classification of the level
of risk posed by individual facilities.3 7 The risk profile of a facility
is determined by the known safety risks of the food produced at
the facility, the compliance history of the facility, the facility's
hazard analysis and risk-based preventative controls, whether the
food produced at the facility meets the criteria for priority under
section 801(h)(1), whether the facility has been third-party
certified under new sections 801(q) and 806, and in light of any
other criteria "deemed necessary and appropriate by the
Secretary."38 Domestic high-risk facilities must be inspected at
least once during the first five-year period following the
enactment of the FSMA, and again at least once every three years
thereafter. 39 Domestic non-high-risk facilities must be inspected
at least once during the first seven-year period following the
enactment of the FSMA, and then at least once every five years
thereafter. 40 Additionally, at least 600 foreign facilities must be
inspected within the first year following the enactment of the
FSMA and the number of foreign facilities inspected must be
doubled every subsequent year for the five years thereafter. 4 1 To
carry out these tasks, as well as other duties required by the
FSMA, section 401 authorizes the appropriation of FDA funds for
field activities and to increase the number of FDA field staff.42
Section 101 of the FS1VIA amends section 414(a) of the FD&C
(21 U.S.C. 350c(a)) by authorizing the Secretary to have access to
all records relating to an article of food "the Secretary reasonably
believes" will cause "serious adverse health consequences or death
to humans or animals," or that might be "likely to be affected in a
similar manner."43
Section 202 of the FSMA, adding new section 422 to the
FD&C, directs the FDA to establish a program for the testing of
food by accredited laboratories and establishes a system for
laboratory accreditation. 44
37. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 201(a), § 421(a).
38. Id. sec. 201(a), § 421(a)(1)(A)-(F).
39. Id. sec. 201(a), § 421(a)(2)(B).
40. Id. sec. 201(a), § 421(a)(2)(C).
41. Id. sec. 201(a), § 421(a)(2)(D).
42. Id. sec. 401(a)-(b).
43. Id. sec. 101(a), § 414(a).
44. Id. sec. 202(a), § 422(a)(1).
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Section 402, adding new section 1012 to the FD&C,
establishes whistleblower protections for employees of entities
involved in the manufacturing, processing, packing,
transportation, distribution, reception, holding, or importation of
food, who provide information relating to a violation of food safety
laws. 45
3. Imported Food Safety
A significant portion of the U.S. food supply is imported46 and
in order to ensure that imported foods are safe and meet U.S.
safety standards, the FSMA provides the FDA with
"unprecedented authority" to regulate imported food, and imposes
preventative duties on the industry.47  Title III of the FSMA
includes sections amending the FD&C to improve importer
accountability, provide programs for third-party certification,
create requirements for certification of high-risk foods, establish
voluntary qualified importer programs, and grant authority to
deny admission of foreign food products. 48
45. Id. sec. 402, § 1012(a)(1)-(4).
46. "An estimated 15 percent of the U.S. food supply is imported,
including 60 percent of fresh fruits and vegetables and 80 percent of seafood."
Food Safety Legislation Key Facts, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm237934.htm (last
updated Mar. 20, 2011)
47. Background on the FSMA, supra note 21.
48. Id. As the amendments to the FD&C concerning imported food
safety are beyond the scope of this article, a brief summary of their changes
will be included here: Section 301 of the FSMA, adding new section 805 to the
FD&C, requires importers to "perform risk-based foreign supplier verification
activities" to ensure that the food imported has been produced in compliance
with HARCP requirements of the FSMA. FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act, sec. 301(a), § 805(a)(1). Some of the verification activities that the FDA
may require include monitoring records for shipments, lot-by-lot certification
of compliance, annual on-site inspections, review of the foreign supplier's
HARCP, and periodic testing and sampling of shipments. Id. sec. 301(a), §
805(c)(4).
The FDA is permitted to require, under section 303 of the FSMA, that
an entity provide certification or assurances that imported food is compliant
with FSMA requirements as a condition for admission into the United States.
Id. sec. 303(b), § 801(q)(1). These assurances or certifications may come from
an agency or representative of a foreign country or by persons or entities
accredited by the FDA. Id. sec. 303(b), § 801(q)(3). In determining whether
to require import certification the FDA shall assess such factors as the known
risks of the food, the known food safety risks associated with the exporting
country, and any finding questioning the food safety programs or standards
895
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4. Response
Another key provision of the FSMA is the improved capacity
it provides the FDA for responding to food safety problems.
Mandatory recall authority is the most significant and novel
authority provided to the FDA by the FSMA but additional
authorities granted by the FSMA include: expanded
administrative detention, suspension of registration, enhanced
product tracing abilities, and additional recordkeeping for high-
risk foods. 49 Section 206, adding new section 423 to the FD&C,
of the exporting country by the FDA that is supported by scientific, risk-
based evidence. Id. sec. 303(b), § 801(q)(2)(A)-(D).
Section 307 of the FSMIA requires the FDA to establish a system for
recognizing accreditation bodies that accredit third-party auditors to certify
that foreign suppliers are in compliance with the FSMA within two years of
its enactment. Id. sec. 307, § 808(b)(1)(A)(i). Accreditation bodies are
required to ensure that the third-party auditors being accredited agree to
submit written and electronic certification that will accompany each food
shipment for import into the U.S. coming from a certified facility. Id. sec.
307, § 808(c)(2)(A). The FDA is required to develop model standards for
third-party auditors and prohibits third-party auditors that have conflicts of
interest. Id. sec. 307, § 808(b)(2). Audits must be unannounced and auditors
are required to immediately notify the FDA upon discovering a condition that
could cause or contribute to a serious risk to public health. Id. sec. 307, §
808(c)(4)(A). If imported food, certified by an accredited auditor, is linked to
an illness outbreak, the FDA must withdraw its accreditation. Id. sec. 307, §
808(c)(6)(A)(i).
The FDA is granted the authority to enter into arrangements and
agreements with foreign governments to facilitate inspections of foreign
facilities, and is required to allocate funds for the inspections of foreign
facilities, especially those deemed to present a high risk. Id. sec. 306(a), §
807(a). The FDA may also deny admission into the United States of imported
foods coming from facilities that refused to allow U.S. inspectors or their
accredited proxy to inspect and conduct the necessary audits. Id. sec. 306, §
807(b).
Importers and foreign food facilities may request to participate in the
voluntary qualified importer program that the FDA is required to establish
under section 302. Id. sec. 302, § 806(a)(1)(A)-(B). The program essentially
expedites the review of imports from participating facilities, allowing for their
certification if the facilities meet the eligibility requirements. Id. Eligibility
is limited to certified facilities and in determining eligibility the FDA is
required to consider factors such as the known safety risks of the food
imported, the compliance history of the importer and foreign facilities, the
regulatory system used by the exporting country, and any other indicia or
risk determined appropriate by the FDA. Id. sec. 302, § 806(d).
49. Background on the FSMA, supra note 21. High-risk foods are to be
designated by the FDA within one year of the enactment of the FSMA taking
into account the known safety risks of a particular food and the likelihood of
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authorizes the FDA to issue a cease distribution order to any
producer and/or distributor of food that the FDA determines there
is a reasonable probability of its adulteration or misbranding
(under FD&C sections 402 and 403(w) respectively), which will
cause "serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or
animals," after first providing the producer the opportunity to
voluntarily cease distribution and recall the food product in
question.5 0 Civil fines are imposed on any person not complying
with a recall order.5 1
Section 207 of the FSMA enhances the FDA's power to order
administrative detentions of food products that may be in
violation of food safety requirements. 52 By changing the language
of FD&C section 304(h)(1)(A) from "credible evidence or
information indicating" to "reason to believe," this section of the
FSMA is essentially lowering the standards for an administrative
detention and expanding the circumstances in which a detention
may be ordered.53 Additionally, the standard for which food
product is in violation of the food safety requirements is further
diminished by changing the language from "presents a threat of
serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or
animals" to "is adulterated or misbranded."54
Registration of food production facilities with the FDA is
required under section 350d(a) of the FD&C,5 5 and section 102 of
microbiological or chemical contamination due to the nature of or processing
used for a particular food. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec.
204(d)(2)(A).
50. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 206(a), § 423(a).
51. Id. sec. 206(c), § 303(f)(2)(A).
52. See id. sec. 207(a), § 304(h)(1)(A).
53. See id.; see also E-Alert: Congress Passes the FDA Food Safety





54. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 207(a)(2), §
304(h)(1)(A).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 350d(a) (Supp. 2011). A facility is: "any factory,
warehouse, or establishment (including a factory, warehouse, or
establishment of an importer) that manufactures, processes, packs, or holds
food." 21 U.S.C. § 350d(c)(1) (Supp. 2011). While farms are not considered
facilities, the FDA is required by the FSMA to determine which activities
"constitute on-farm packing or holding of food that is not grown, raised, or
897
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the FSMA, amending section 415 of the FD&C, allows the FDA to
suspend a facility's registration if it determines that the registrant
was responsible for, or knew or should have known that there was
a reasonable probability that its food product posed a risk of
"causing serious adverse health consequences or death to humans
or animals."56 Section 102 includes the right for a registrant to
obtain an informal hearing on an FDA determination to suspend
its registration and requires the FDA to vacate the suspension if
the FDA determines there are inadequate grounds to continue the
suspension. 57 Otherwise, a facility under a suspension order is
prohibited from introducing food into interstate or intrastate
commerce in the United States.5 8  This section also includes a
requirement that the FDA promulgate a small entity compliance
guide within 180 days of the enactment of the FS1VIA to assist
small entities in complying with registration requirements
compelled by section 102, and clarifies the definition of "retail food
establishments." 59
The FDA is directed by section 204 of the FSVIA to establish a
system to enhance its ability to track and trace both domestic and
imported foods. 60 The FDA must create pilot projects "to explore
and evaluate methods to rapidly and effectively identify recipients
of food to prevent or mitigate a foodborne illness outbreak and to
address credible threats" of serious harm resulting from
adulterated food. 61 Lastly, the FDA is directed to publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking establishing recordkeeping requirements
for facilities it designates as producing high-risk foods. 62
5. Enhanced Partnerships
Throughout the FS1VIA there are numerous sections that
consumed on such farm or another farm under the same ownership" and
which activities "constitute on-farm manufacturing or processing of food that
is not consumed on that farm or on another farm under common ownership."
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(c)(1)(A). Essentially, the FDA
will ultimately clarify to what degree processing transforms a farm into a
facility.
56. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 102(b), § 415(b)(1).
57. Id. sec. 102(b), § 415(b)(3).
58. Id. sec. 102(b), § 415(b)(4).
59. Id. sec. 102(b)(2), § 415(b); id. sec.102(c)(1).
60. Id. sec. 204; Background on the FSMA, supra note 21.
61. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 204(a)(1).
62. Id. sec. 204(d)(1).
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require the FDA to consult with other agencies, such as the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department
of Homeland Security, as well as foreign government agencies,
recognizing the need for interagency cooperation in order to
achieve public health goals through an integrated system.63 For
example, it is up to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to issue guidelines with respect to "activities that constitute on-
farm packing or holding of food that is not grown, raised, or
consumed" on that farm64 and rule-making for produce standards
must be done in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture,
representatives of state departments of agriculture, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security. 65 With respect to imported food,
the FS1IA directs the FDA to "develop a comprehensive plan to
expand the capacity of foreign governments and their industries.
One component of the plan is to address training of foreign
governments and food producers on U.S. food safety
requirements." 66  The small farm exemption, provided by the
Tester-Hagan Amendment (addressed below), includes a reliance
on state and local agencies to address the safety measures used by
these exempt facilities. 67
B. Tester-Hagan Amendment
As this article focuses on the requirements imposed by the
FSMA on small and mid-sized farms and facilities, it is necessary
to provide a more in-depth analysis of the provisions and
exemptions added by the Tester-Hagan Amendment in sections
103 and 105. Recognizing that all of the well-publicized incidents
of contamination in recent years occurred in industrialized food
supply chains, Senators Jon Tester and Kay Hagan sponsored this
amendment to remove small, local food growers and processors
from federal oversight, leaving them to the existing regulatory
framework of states and localities. 68 While Part III of this article
will discuss the pros and cons of the FS1VIA generally and will
examine them specifically in relation to the Tester-Hagan
63. See Background on the FSMA, supra note 21.
64. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(c)(1)(A).
65. Id. sec. 105(a), § 419(a)(1)(A).
66. Background on the FSMA, supra note 21.
67. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(2).
68. MacDonald & McGeary, supra note 19.
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Amendment, this section is limited to describing its facial
provisions.
It is first important to note that the Tester-Hagan
Amendment pertains only to Title I of the FS1IA and particularly
to the HARCP requirements of the FSMA, and does not extend to
other provisions of the FSMA. In section 102 of the FS1VIA
(registration of food facilities), the Tester-Hagan Amendment
clarifies the definition of "retail food establishment" in response to
the 2002 Bioterrorism Act, 69 which required all food facilities to
register with the FDA but exempted "retail food
establishments." 70 The amendment required the "FDA to clarify
that 'direct sales' of food to consumers includes sales that occur
other than where the food was manufactured, such as at a
roadside stand or farmers' market."71 Therefore, in section 102(c)
of the FS1VIA, the Secretary is directed to amend the previously
narrow definition of "retail food establishment" to specifically
69. The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, WASH. ST. DEP'T OF AGRIc.,
http://agr.wa.gov/FoodSecurity/TheBioterrorismAct.aspx (last updated Aug.
2, 2004) ("The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act, commonly known as The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, is designed
to protect the U.S. from bioterrorism. The law authorizes the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to take action to protect
the nation's food supply against the threat of intentional contamination. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as the food regulatory arm of HHS, is
responsible for developing and implementing these food safety measures,
including four major regulations."); see also Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, H.R. 3448, 107th Cong.
(2002).
70. FDA defined the term "retail food establishments" at 21 C.F.R. §
1.227(b)(11) (2010):
Retail food establishment means an establishment that sells food
products directly to consumers as its primary function. A retail food
establishment may manufacture/process, pack, or hold food if the
establishment's primary function is to sell from that establishment
food, including food that it manufactures/processes, packs, or holds,
directly to consumers. A retail food establishment's primary
function is to sell food directly to consumers if the annual monetary
value of sales of food products directly to consumers exceeds the
annual monetary value of sales of food products to all other buyers.
The term "consumers" does not include businesses. A "retail food
establishment" includes grocery stores, convenience stores, and
vending machine locations.
71. Summary of Tester Amendment, U.S. SEN. JON TESTER,
http://tester.senate.gov/Legislation/upload/tester-amendmentagreement-su
mmary.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2011) (emphasis omitted).
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include the sale of food products or food directly to the consumer
at a roadside stand or farmer's market, even if the stand or
market is not located where the food is manufactured or
processed, as well as to include the sale and distribution of food
through a community supported agriculture program (CSA) and
any other direct food sales platform as determined by the
Secretary. 72
The main thrust of the Tester-Hagan Amendment is
contained in section 103 of the FSMA, the HARCP section, adding
new FD&C section "418(1) Modified Requirements for Qualified
Facilities."73  Here, food facilities may qualify for an exemption
from the HARCP requirements if they meet the following
conditions: (1) the facility is a "very small business" (as defined by
a study that the FDA is required to conduct within 18 months of
the enactment of the FSMA; or (2) the average annual monetary
value of all food sold by the facility during the previous three-year
period was less than $500,000 (adjusted for inflation), and during
that three-year period the majority of the food sold by the facility
was to "qualified end-users."74  Section 103(a) (FD&C section
418(1)(4)(B)) defines a qualified end user as a direct consumer
(which is not a business), restaurant, or retail food establishment
(e.g., a grocery store) that was either in the same state of the
facility or within 275 miles of the facility. 75
Qualified facilities that are exempted from the HARCP
requirements must still submit documentation to the FDA proving
their status as qualified exempted facilities and demonstrating
either that (1) they have identified potential hazards associated
with their food production, are implementing preventative
controls to address the hazards, and are monitoring the controls to
ensure their efficacy, or (2) their facility is in compliance with
state, local, county, or other applicable non-Federal food safety
law. 76 If the facility chooses the second option (compliance with
non-Federal food safety law), it must prominently and
conspicuously provide the name and address of the facility that
produced the food on a packaging label, or display the same
72. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 102(c)(1).
73. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1).
74. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(1)(B)-(C), § 418(n).
75. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(4)(B)-(C).
76. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(2).
901
902 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:887
information at the point of purchase. 7
Small-scale, direct-marketing farms may also qualify for an
exemption from the separate produce safety standards in section
105 of the FSMA, in which the FDA regulates growing and
harvesting practices, provided that they meet the same
requirements for exempted facilities under section 103(a).78
Additionally, the Tester-Hagan Amendment requires the FDA
to conduct a study (mentioned above) of the food-processing sector
to determine the definitions of the terms "small business" and
"very small business."79 The study will focus on the distribution of
food by type and size of operation, including the monetary value of
food sold; the proportion of food produced by each type and size of
operation; the number and types of food facilities co-located on
farms; the incidence of foodborne illnesses originating from each
size and type of operation (as well as which types have no reported
or known hazards); and the effect on foodborne illness risk with
respect to the scale of operation.8 0  The definition of the terms
required by section 103(a) of the FSMA requires the FDA to
consider such factors as harvestable acres, income, number of
employees, and the volume of food harvested.81
The exemption provided for qualified facilities in section
103(a) of the FSMA (amending section 418(1) of the FD&C) may be
withdrawn at the FDA's discretion if the Secretary determines
that it is necessary to protect the public health.82 Section 103(a),
which amends FD&C section 418(l)(3), provides such discretion in
the event of an active investigation of a foodborne illness outbreak
that is directly linked to an exempted facility, or if the FDA finds
it "necessary to protect the public health and prevent or mitigate a
foodborne illness outbreak based on conduct or conditions
associated with a qualified facility that are material to the safety
of the food" at that facility. 83
The FDA is required to provide, within 180 days of
promulgating new regulations under FD&C section 418(n), a
77. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(7).
78. Id. sec. 105(a), § 419(f).
79. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(5).
80. Id.
81. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(5)(B).
82. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(3).
83. Id.
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small entity compliance policy guide to assist small entities that
meet the definition of "small business" and "very small business"
(to be determined by the study), explaining the FSMA's hazard
analysis compliance requirements in "plain language."84
Furthermore, the regulations must "provide sufficient flexibility to
be practicable for all sizes and types of facilities, including small
businesses," in establishing science-based minimum standards for
HARCP under section 10385 and for establishing science-based
minimum standards for produce safety under section 105.86
III. Too LITTLE, Too BROAD, Too BAD
While the amendments and key provisions detailed in Part II
provide the FDA with more authority and establish preventative
measures to minimize the potential of foodborne illness outbreaks,
the legislation is insufficient for tackling the problems posed by
large-scale, industrialized food production, and unnecessarily
burdens small and mid-sized facilities and farms that do not pose
the same threats as larger operations. Additionally, many of the
improvements established by the FSMA are dependent on agency
discretion for their implementation and enforcement, and
therefore the potential impact the law will have for food safety
and its burden on small farms and facilities is dependent on the
character and policies of the FDA.8 7
Before analyzing the drawbacks of the FSMIA it is important
to briefly discuss the assertion that large-scale, industrialized food
production operations pose a greater threat to food safety than do
smaller, local food production operations. Large-scale industrial
84. Id. sec. 103(d).
85. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(n).
86. Id. sec. 105(a), § 419(a)(1), (3).
87. Although the effect of the new legislation on imported food safety is
debatably minimal, an in-depth examination of the pros and cons of this
aspect of the FSMA is beyond the scope of this article. For further insight on
the potential impact of the FSMA on imported food, see generally Liu, supra
note 2 (discussing the potential drawbacks in protecting U.S. consumers by
outsourcing regulatory power to China); Adam I. Muchmore, Private
Regulation and Foreign Conduct, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, 419 (2010)
(discussing regulatory strategies with respect to imported food and
concluding that the majority of proposals for imported-food-safety reform "try
to do too much - and in the process risk doing too little"); but see Hoffmann &
Harder, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing the advantages of global coordination
of food safety management).
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food production, often referred to as agribusiness, "relies upon
heavy pesticide use, radiation, and other harsher interventions to
kill germs in food grown in assembly line fashion."88 Large-scale
food production involves "highly mechanized, monocultural,
chemical-intensive methods" that transport raw materials to
centralized processing facilities where they are mixed with
production from other farms, and then packaged and shipped
throughout the country.89 The rate of foodborne illness incidents
has increased in tandem with the growth of this industrial food
system, and most cases of contaminated food "are the result of
unsanitary conditions in the large-scale facilities that mass
produce and process foods."90
Conversely, small and mid-sized farming practices, and
notably organic farming practices, focus on the health of the soil,
plant, and food, 91 and are typically more accountable to consumers
because of their proximity to the end-user. Local, sustainable food
producers "use a systems approach that achieves greater safety
and quality than any industrial producer using [Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Points] or [good agricultural practices], and
are held accountable by the direct-to-consumer relationship, which
creates greater transparency than any government regulation."92
Animals raised on small-scale, diverse farms, particularly organic,
free-range farms, do not contribute the harmful pathogens that
end up in other agricultural products because their varied diet,
exercise, and exposure to good bacteria help them build resistance
to the harmful pathogens.9 3
88. Alison Rose Levy, Food Safety: Why is the Food Safety Bill So
Controversial?, HUFFPOST HEALTH (Dec. 13, 2010, 4:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alison-rose-levy/food-safety-why-food-safety-
bi b_795515.html.
89. HELENA NORBERG-HODGE, TODD MERRIFIELD & STEVEN GORELICK,
BRINGING THE FOOD ECONoMY HOME: LOCAL ALTERNATIVES TO GLOBAL
AGRIBUSINESS 3-4 (2002).
90. Id. at 57-58.
91. Levy, supra note 88.
92. Judith McGeary, Comment to Does the Food Safety Bill Give the FDA
Too Much Power - Or Not Enough?, GRIST (Nov. 17, 2010, 1:45 PM),
http://www.grist.org/article/food-2010-11-17-does-the-food-safety-bill-give-the-
fda-too-much-power.
93. NORBERG-HODGE, MERRIFIELD & GORELICK, supra note 89, at 59.
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A. Too little: The FSMA does not adequately address the
problems and health risks posed by large-scale, industrial food
production operations.
The key provisions of the FSMA amending the FD&C to
enhance food safety are the preventative measures established by
the HARCP, the increased rate of inspections, the mandatory
recall authority, and the whistleblower protections. On their face
these additions to the FD&C appear to be improvements, but will
not likely have the significant effect intended by the proponents of
the legislation. This sub-section will discuss how the FS1VA
requires too little of large-scale food production operations.
1. Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventative Control Plans
The HARCP requirement (for which small farms and facilities
may be exempted) 94 is analogous to the HACCP programs, which
were first developed within the food industry and later imposed
through regulations, and "require companies to examine their
production streams, identify points where pathogens or other
hazards may enter the system, and take steps to make those
processes safer."95  This systematic method of identifying
foodborne hazards, assessing their criticality, and controlling
weak points provides food production operations with a flexible
approach capable of adapting to changing conditions rather than a
specific mandate for the use of specific controls. 96  The meat,
poultry, juice, and seafood industries are already required to have
HACCP programs. 97 While some critics acknowledge that HACCP
has made modest safety improvements within these industries,9 8
it has received a mixed response from the food industry and
consumers. 99 Because "HACCP requires relatively sophisticated
94. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.
95. Gregory Conko, More FDA Authority Won't Improve Food Safety,
FORBEs (Dec. 2, 2010, 3:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/12/02/fda-
regulation-food-safety-opinions-contributors-gregory-conko-print.html.
96. Hoffmann & Harder, supra note 3, at 20-21.
97. See 9 C.F.R. § 417 (2011) (requiring meat and poultry establishments
to implement HACCP programs); 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.1, 120.8 (2011) (requiring
juice processors to implement HACCP programs); 21 C.F.R. §§ 123.6, 1240
(2011) (requiring seafood processors to implement HACCP programs).
98. See Conko, supra note 95.
99. Hoffmann & Harder, supra note 3, at 21.
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administration and management," it tends to work well for large
companies that already have complicated "industrial engineering
management practices," 00  but "[a]s implemented by
regulators ... HACCP tends to smother [smaller companies] in
paperwork and impose rigid, costly, and out-of-date practices that
simply have not kept up with changes in the food industry."' 0
Thus, the requirements discourage innovation of new safety
mechanisms, and compliance with HACCP is very expensive.102
The HACCP requirements imposed by section 103 of the FSMA
will do little to improve safety at large-scale food production
facilities primarily because these facilities already have voluntary
HACCP programs in place.103
2. Increased Inspections
The mandatory inspections provided for in section 201 of the
FSMA, which are to increase in frequency depending on a facility's
risk-profile, do little to improve food safety in three reasons: (1)
inspections are marginally useful for detecting harmful microbial
pathogens that cause foodborne illness outbreaks; (2) increasing
the frequency of inspections requires funding, which is not
provided by the FSMA; and (3) the modest increase in frequency is
not likely to make a significant difference. Inspections generally
include visual observations of the premises and production,
examination of records and safety plans, and written reports of
the inspector's findings after considering the many factors
detailed in the FDA's "Investigations Operations Manual."l 04 The
FDA's lofty goals for inspections are laudable, but the quality of
an inspection is only as good as the inspector and is limited by
what the inspector focuses on.105 For example, even if a facility
100. Id.
101. Conko, supra note 95.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also Josh Ozersky, The Food-Safety Bill: Flawed, and
Needed, TIME (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nationL/article/0,8599,
2035806,00.html; Russell Libby, Comment to Does the Food Safety Bill Give
the FDA Too Much Power - Or Not Enough?, GRIST (Nov. 17, 2010, 1:45 PM),
http://www.grist.org/article/food-2010-11-17-does-the-food-safety-bill-give-the-
fda-too-much-power.
104. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INVESTIGATIONS OPERATIONS
MANUAL (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/
default.htm.
105. Erik Olson, director of chemical and food safety programs at the Pew
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appears clean and is not listed as "high-risk," it may still harbor
harmful pathogens, while another facility that appears dirty and
disorganized may indeed be sterile.106  It is impractical for an
inspector to visually determine whether or not a facility poses a
safety risk, which is "the main reason why meat and poultry
account for about half of all the food-borne illness outbreaks even
though slaughterhouses may not legally operate without USDA
inspectors on the premises at all times."10 7
Furthermore, the costs associated with increasing the
frequency of inspections are staggering, and doubling the current
inspection rates would "account for most of the [FSMA's] $1.4
billion four-year cost."10 8 Section 401 authorizes the appropriation
of funds from the FDA budget to increase the number of field staff;
however, it remains to be seen whether Congress will make the
necessary appropriations to fully fund the provisions of the FSMA.
The FSMA is an authorizing bill and appropriations for it must
still come from future Congressional legislation.10 9 Even Deputy
Commissioner of the FDA's Office of Foods, Michael Taylor,
publicly recognized the funding limitation of the FSMA when he
noted that, "fulfilling the Congressional vision embedded in the
new law .. . will require new resources and investment." 10
It is also difficult to contemplate how doubling the rate of
inspections to once every three or five years (depending on the
facility's risk-profile) will seriously improve food safety. The
salmonella outbreak originating from the PCA plant in Georgia
Charitable Trust's Health and Human Services Program has stated that
'.[t]he mere fact that there is an inspection isn't enough . .. [y]ou've got to
have the inspector properly trained and inspect frequently enough to detect
problems. If any of this falls short, you can have a serious problem."' Kristin
Choo, Hungry For Change: The Feds Consider a Steady Diet of Stronger
Regulation to Help Fix the U.S. Food Safety Network, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at
56, 60.
106. Conko, supra note 95.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Ferd Hoefner, Comment to Will the Food Safety Modernization Act
Better Protect Us From Contaminated Food?, GRIST (Nov. 12, 2010, 6:30 AM),
http://www.grist.org/article/2010-11-11-food-fight-food-safety-modernization-
act-better-protect-us.
110. Michael R. Taylor, Deputy Comm'r for Foods, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., Address at the FDLI Food Safety Conference: The FDA Food Safety
Modernization Act: Putting Ideas Into Action (Jan. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/ucm241192.htm.
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(mentioned in the introduction) occurred even though the facility
was inspected nine times within a three-year period."' The PCA
example is also indicative of the ineffectiveness of random
sampling, as the sample of processed peanuts tested by inspectors
there came up negative for salmonella.11 2 However, the FSMA
does incorporate a lesson learned from the PCA scandal. Section
307 incorporates a system for accrediting third-party auditors and
includes a sub-section specifically addressing conflicts of interest
as well as proscribing announced inspections by third-party
auditors (both problematic in the PCA context where the third-
party inspector of the Georgia plant was paid by PCA and not its
customer Kellogg, and had pre-arranged a date for inspection with
plant personnel)."13
3. Mandatory Recall Authority
The mandatory recall authority provided by the FSMA has
been characterized as "a solution in search of a problem.""14
Previous recalls were strictly voluntary and the FDA relied on
"the cooperation of food manufacturers, processors, wholesalers,
and retailers to accomplish the arduous and expensive job of
extracting contaminated food from commerce.""l5 Companies are
usually willing to voluntarily recall tainted food.11 6  While a
voluntary system makes obvious sense in that companies have a
vested interest in maintaining the public's goodwill toward their
products, a case can be made post-PCA scandal for greater
government power to address "laz[y] or malfeasan[t]"
manufacturers like PCA." 7 Nevertheless, this added authority is
a mere formality because in reality it would be difficult "to identify
a single case in which producers refused to honor a recall request
based on evidence that a product was actually or likely to be
tainted.""' Additionally, it is a power begging to be abused in the
111. Steinzor, supra note 13, at 177.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 185-86.
114. Conko, supra note 95.
115. Steinzor, supra note 13, at 185.
116. Benson, supra note 11, at 517.
117. See Steinzor, supra note 13, at 185.
118. Conko, supra note 95; see also Benson, supra note 11, at 517 ('"Most,
if not all, firms that have been implicated in foodborne illness outbreaks
associated with fresh produce are willing to recall their food in order to
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face of public and media pressure over foodborne illness
outbreaks. 119  However, section 206(a) of the FSMA does
contemplate this to some extent by first providing a company with
the opportunity to issue a voluntary recall before proceeding to
section 206(a), whereby the FDA has the authority to require a
cease distribution order. 120 Unfortunately, the mandatory recall
authority does little to improve food safety overall because the real
food safety threat occurs prior to the knowledge of that threat,
which makes the recall essentially a last resort that rarely
resolves the problem. 121
4. Whistleblower Protections
The employee protections provided by section 402 of the
FSMA are an important aspect of the legislation intended to assist
the FDA in preventing food safety issues. Like much of the
FSMA, it is a noble addition to the FD&C, but one with few teeth
in its practical application. Employees in the food industry,
particularly those working for large-scale, industrial food
operations, are not necessarily equipped with the knowledge and
experience to recognize potential food safety risks. For example,
like inspectors who cannot see the microbial pathogens through
visual observation, employees are similarly situated in that they
cannot with their eyes perceive potential threats that are likely
microscopic. Furthermore, as with other similar legislation, the
employees capable of "whistleblowing" (i.e. not management) are
not likely to be aware of the protection afforded them by this
legislation nor are they likely to have the confidence to take on
their employers while already working at presumably low wage
jobs. However, this component of the FSMA could prove quite
protect consumers and preserve their reputations.").
119. Conko, supra note 95; see also Benson, supra note 11, at 516.
120. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec.
206(a), § 423(a), 124 Stat. 3885, 3939-40 (2011).
121. "[E]ven in the best of circumstances, recalls are notoriously difficult
to implement and are not an effective substitute for preventative regulation.
Because products are relatively inexpensive and purchases are so numerous,
retailers rarely have easy access to the names and contact information of
individual customers. Even if such information is available, recalls involving
millions of units are daunting to implement. The GAO reported in 2004 that
'most recalled food is not recovered."' Steinzor, supra note 13, at 186 (citation
omitted).
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effective for enhancing food safety with respect to a specific sub-
set of employees, those involved in quality control, because they
are acutely aware of health-risks and are privy to lab reports and
other data that may reveal food safety hazards. Section 402 of the
FSMA would allow them to report violations even when pressured
by management to be complicit in misrepresenting data, or risk
losing their jobs.
5. Missing from the FSMA
Several elements missing from the FSMA would have
provided consumers with enhanced food safety with respect to
large-scale industrial food operations limitations on the use of
chemical pesticides and fertilizers, a ban on sub-therapeutic
antibiotics, and criminal penalties for knowingly violating and
selling contaminated food. Section 105 of the FSMA purports to
provide "science-based minimum standards" for produce safety
and good agricultural practices for the "safe production and
harvesting" of fruits and vegetables that are "raw agricultural
commodities,"1 22 but noticeably absent from the section is any
reference to the use of chemical pesticides in growing these raw
agricultural commodities. In the letter opening its 2008-2009
Annual Report, the President's Cancer Panel "urge[d]" the
President to "use the power of [his] office to remove the
carcinogens and other toxins from our food, water, and air that
needlessly increase health care costs, cripple our Nation's
productivity, and devastate American lives."1 23  The report
advised that individuals could avoid "[e]xposure to pesticides" by
choosing "food grown without pesticides or chemical fertilizers." 124
The report was not conducted by "fringe" elements of the scientific
community but by "the mission control of mainstream scientific
and medical thinking,"1 25 thus suggesting that the hazards and
risks posed by chemical pesticides and fertilizers are apparent to
122. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 105(a), § 419(a)(1)(A).
123. PRESIDENT'S CANCER PANEL, REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER RISK:
WHAT WE CAN Do Now (2010), available at http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/
advisory/pcp/annualReports/pcp08-09rpt/PCPReport_08-09_508.pdf
124. Id. at 112.
125. Nicholas D. Kristof, New Alarm Bells About Chemicals and Cancer,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A33, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
05/06/opinion/06kristof.html.
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the scientific community and should seriously be considered in
determining "science-based minimum standards for the safe
production and harvesting" of produce as well as for the
publication of what constitute "good agricultural practices" under
section 105 of the FS1A.126
Furthermore, section 104's, "performance standards," direct
the FDA to "review and evaluate the relevant health data and
other relevant information, including that from toxicological and
epidemiological studies and analyses" in determining the most
significant foodborne contaminants. 127  That the President's
Cancer Panel report was available to both Congress and the FDA
prior to the final proposal of this legislation is indicative of its
failure to adequately address serious health concerns posed by the
dominant form of agricultural food production in the U.S. (i.e. the
large-scale, centralized industrial food production operations).
Additionally, the report warned individuals against "exposure
to antibiotics, growth hormones, and toxic run-off from livestock
feed lots," advising them to choose "free-range meat raised
without these medications."1 28  Although meat and poultry
products are beyond the purview of the FDA, the antibiotics and
hormones used in factory farming is within its power to regulate,
and should have been addressed in the FS1VA by withdrawing
approval for animal drug use. The movement from small, local,
family farms to large, industrial factory farms mentioned supra
Part I includes a similar transition within context of livestock
farming.129
The only way for the modern system of industrialized,
concentrated animal farms to be viable is through the use of
antibiotics to prevent dangers of disease and death prevalent
when animals are confined in the cramped quarters of
concentrated animal feed operations (CAFOs).13 0 "American farm
policies and meat processing industries have sacrificed human
health for the economic efficiency of industrialized livestock
126. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 105(a), § 419(a)(1), (e)(1).
127. Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 104, § 2201
128. PRESIDENT'S CANCER PANEL, supra note 123, at 112.
129. See Ariele Lessing, Note, Killing Us Softly: How Sub-Therapeutic
Dosing of Livestock Causes Drug-Resistant Bacteria in Humans, 37 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 463, 463 (2010).
130. See id. at 467-69.
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production."'31 Sub-therapeutic doses of antibiotics ("low levels of
antibiotics that are insufficient to kill an invading bacterial
infection, but are effective in preventing bacterial infection from
occurring"' 32) are particularly dangerous because they are
responsible for creating strains of antibiotic-resistant bacteria
that are "transferred to humans through the animal product,
through human contact with livestock, and through
environmental channels such as a contaminated water supply." 33
Relevant to the FSMA and its goal of preventing foodborne illness
outbreaks, the rise of drug resistant bacteria like salmonella and
E. coli (the usual suspects in foodborne illness outbreaks), is
largely a result of the use of antibiotics in raising livestock.134
These drug resistant bacteria enter the agricultural food supply -
and those fruits and vegetables regulated under produce safety
standards section 105 of the FS1VIA - when manure from CAFOs is
used as fertilizer in agricultural fields, and when it enters the
groundwater used for irrigation in agricultural fields.135  Given
"the plethora of available data on the impact of the use of animal
antibiotics to human health,"1 36 the absence of this obvious food
safety concern from the FSMA is remarkable and deplorable.
Finally, the absence of severe criminal sanctions for violators
that knowingly and intentionally put contaminated food into the
stream of commerce,137 is another example of the failure of the
FSMA to adequately address the hazards posed by large-scale food
production operations. Criminal penalties would provide a serious
deterrent to reckless behavior endangering the health and lives of
Americans. Under the current system, egregious violators like
131. Id. at 463.
132. Id. at 469.
133. Id. at 490.
134. See id. at 472-74.
135. See id. at 475-76.
136. Id. at 488.
137. Although FD&C does provide for a criminal penalty of imprisonment
for up to three years and a fine of not more than $10,000 for committing a
violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, or for committing a second
violation, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2006), FDA "statistics reveal an
extraordinary weak track record for criminal investigations" and
enforcement. Steinzor, supra note 13, at 195-96. Additionally, a first
violation committed without the intent to defraud or mislead is punishable
only by a sentence of not more than one year and/or a fine of not more than
$1,000. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2006).
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PCA chief executive officer Stewart Parnell, whose "[p]lant
operators knowingly shipped peanut products" after they had
tested positive for salmonella,138  would merely receive
misdemeanors, with little to no jail time and small fines.139 As
mentioned supra Part III.A.3, recalls are only minimally effective
for protecting consumers, and thus, a deterrence mechanism
beyond fines (that have relatively little impact on large
businesses), is critical for enhancing food safety and was
unfortunately left out of the FSVA.
B. Too Broad: The FSMA unnecessarily burdens small and mid-
sized facilities and farms that do not pose the same threat as
large-scale operations.
While many of the reforms enhanced the authority of the
FDA, and heightened restrictions in the FSMIA will have only a
minimal effect on large food production operations, the one-size-
fits-all legislation of the FSMA, which is barely discerning in its
scope, may have a disproportionate and disastrous effect on small
and midsized farms that do not fit within the exemption provided
by the Tester-Hagan Amendment. This section will discuss how
the FS1VIA overburdens small food production operations that do
not qualify for an exemption from the preventative measures of
section 103 as well as the positive and negative aspects of the
Tester-Hagan Amendment as enacted.
1. The Regulatory Burden of the FSMA on Small and Mid-Sized
Farms
The extent of the regulatory burden of the FS1VIA is relative to
the size and nature of the operation being regulated. For the most
part, those facilities and farms selling a majority of their products
directly, and grossing less than $500,000 annually, will not be
subject to the preventative measures, or HARCP, of section 103,
and will not be subject to the produce safety standards and good
138. Steinzor, supra note 13, at 176-78.
139. Id. at 179. Although the tort system functions, in part, as a
deterrent, it is not sufficient for preventing serious violations. PCA may have
been bankrupted by the civil justice system, but while financial risk is
inherent in every business venture, a felony conviction is not, and serious
criminal liability could deter the type of callous behavior demonstrated by
Parnell.
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agricultural practices of section 105.140 Additionally, those
businesses deemed "very small" following the study prescribed by
section 103 will also be exempt from the regulatory burdens of
sections 103 and 105.141 While the discretionary aspects of this
study's determination will be addressed more fully below, it is
noteworthy here that many small and mid-sized farms and
facilities will not fall within the exemption and will thus be
subject to these sections' requirements. At the outset it is also
important to point out that all businesses are subject to the
remainder of the requirements and authority of the FDA provided
by the FSMA. Finally, it should be noted that the definition of a
small business, specifically with respect to farms, is relative to the
geographic region where it is located. "[O]ne of the main tenets of
local foods is [the recognition] that every area is different, based
on its ecology and the community." 42
The first and most obvious burden on small and mid-sized
facilities is the HARCP requirements in section 103. While they
may not be overly burdensome on large facilities that have
"capital-intensive, compliance department-managed,
standardized, large-scale operations" (and likely already have
voluntary HACCP programs in place), the reality for "low-input,
owner-manned and -operated, diversified, small-scale operations"
is distinctly different.143 These smaller facilities would have to
analyze the potential hazards of their operation, "identify and
implement preventative controls" to mitigate the identified
hazards, "monitor the performance of those controls," and
"maintain records of the monitoring as a matter of routine
practice." 44  As much of the HARCP requirements are highly
technical and must be "science-based,"1 45 in reality, this likely
140. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec.
103(a), 105(a), §§ 418(1), 419(f), 124 Stat. 3885, 3892-95, 3903-04 (2011).
141. Id.
142. Judith McGeary, Comment to Will the Food Safety Modernization
Act Harm Small Farms or Producers?, GRIsT (Nov 15, 2010, 6:46 PM),
http://www.grist.org/article/food-2010-11-15-food-fight-safety-modernization-
act-harm-small-farms.
143. See Roland McReynolds, S.510 Opinion: Protect Small Farms, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/11/why-
local-food-movement-opposes-large-scale-food-safety/.
144. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec.
103(a), § 418(a), 124 Stat. 3885, 3889.
145. Id. sec.103(a), §418(n)(1)(A); sec.103(c)(1)(C).
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involves hiring third-parties to assist in the initial analysis,
specialists to assist in developing and implementing controls, and
employees to handle the administrative task of monitoring and
record-keeping.
Although the regulations imposed by the FDA under this
section are supposed to "provide sufficient flexibility to be
practicable for all sizes and types of facilities,"1 46 and the FDA is
required to provide "a small entity compliance guide setting forth
in plain language the requirements,"1 47 it is unclear whether such
protective measures would actually minimize the costs for smaller
facilities. For example, a recently published FDA guidance
document for processing cut leafy greens, which many small and
mid-sized farms that prepare salad mixes would be potentially
subject to, "estimates that it would take a trained corporate team
100 hours to develop an appropriate safety plan, not to mention
the cost of tests that such a plan would have to require."1 48
Simply reading guidance documents issued by the FDA is time-
consuming and requires a level of sophistication beyond the "plain
language" requirements.
HACCP, and here HARCP, compliance is "hugely expensive,"
and forcing small and mid-sized facilities to absorb these costs
could potentially drive them out of business.149 Evidence of this
effect can be found by looking at what the mandatory HACCP
plans did to small and mid-sized slaughterhouses.s 0 After USDA
regulations requiring HACCP plans for slaughterhouses were
146. Id. sec.103(a), §418(n)(3)(A).
147. Id. sec.103(d).
148. McReynolds, supra note 143. McReynolds based this assertion on a
proposed collection of information submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget and published in the Federal Register. Guide to Minimize Microbial
Food Safety Hazards of Fresh-Cut Fruits and Vegetables, 75 Fed. Reg. 65491,
65494 (Oct. 25, 2010).
149. Conko, supra note 95; see also Tom Philpott, Patty Lovera, & Judith
McGeary, Comment to Will the Food Safety Modernization Act Harm Small
Farms or Producers?, GRIST (Nov 15, 2010, 6:46 PM),
http://www.grist.org/article/food-2010-11-15-food-fight-safety-modernization-
act-harm-small-farms.
150. See A. Bryan Endres & Michaela Tarr, United States Food Law
Update: Initial Food Safety Restructuring Efforts, Poultry Production
Contract Reforms and Genetically Engineered Rice Litigation, 6 J. FOOD L. &
POL'Y 103, 117 (2010); Judith McGeary, Comment to Will the Food Safety
Modernization Act Harm Small Farms or Producers?, supra note 142.
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promulgated in 1996, many slaughterhouses went out of business
because of the high costs involved in implementing the
programs.' 5 It has been argued that small slaughterhouses were
already in decline,152 but small, local farms 153 are actually
becoming more prevalent, and it cannot be argued that hiring
safety consultants, identifying, implementing, monitoring
controls, maintaining records, and training employees does not
add expenses. In fact, an analysis conducted by a farm operator at
Rivendelle Farm in North Carolina estimated that "a typical small
farm doing on-farm processing would need 150 hours to create,
implement and monitor the [HARCP] plan, and [would] spend
$9,500 per year on consulting and testing costs. If the farm hired
a consultant to create the plan, the first year costs zoo[m] to
$20,000."154 This analysis is "consistent with the concerns of local
and organic farming advocates across the country" as evidenced by
the findings of a small California farm that estimated that "it
would cost their operation 100 hours to develop and implement a
HARPC plan, plus two hours per day to maintain it, and $15,000
151. See Judith McGeary, Comment to Will the Food Safety
Modernization Act Harm Small Farms or Producers?, supra note 142. In this
Grist forum discussion (relied on here because this is an area of evolving
policy not covered in depth by traditional sources) discussing the impact that
the FSMA will have on small farms and producers with experts from
consumer organizations, victim-advocacy groups, and sustainable farming
advocates, Judith McGeary (founder and executive director of the Farm and
Ranch Freedom Alliance), Russell Libby (executive director of the Maine
Organic Farmers and Gardeners Association) and Patty Lovera (assistant
director of Food & Water Watch), among others in the field, commented on
the decline of small and mid-sized slaughterhouses after the USDA mandated
HACCP programs and noted the high costs of hiring consultants to write food
safety plans. Id.
152. Michael Bulger, Comment to Will the Food Safety Modernization Act
Harm Small Farms or Producers?, supra note 142 (arguing that "small
slaughterhouses had been rapidly declining in numbers for half a century,
the USDA sa[id].").
153. Small, local farms often incorporate some form of processing which
would categorize them as facilities and thus be subject to the HARCP
requirements. See Russell Libby, Comment to Will the Food Safety
Modernization Act Better Protect Us From Contaminated Food?, supra note
109.
154. Roland McReynolds, HURTING NC's LOCAL FOOD HARVEST: THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY LEGISLATION ON NORTH
CAROLINA'S SVIALL AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, CAROLINA FARM STEWARDSHIP
Ass'N 7 (2010), http://www.carolinafarmstewards.org/docs/Hurting NC's
LocalFoodHarvest04201O.PDF.
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in annual testing fees." 55
The second disadvantage to small and mid-sized facilities is
that the provision disincentives growth by making profitability a
potential liability. Setting the qualification for exemption at
$500,000 constrains small and mid-sized farms and facilities that
may be close to that threshold. Considering that it is a gross
revenue threshold or "value of all food sold by such facility," 56 not
accounting for expenses and overhead, a farm or facility may not
be turning a profit, yet would still have to comply with the
expensive HARCP requirements. One farmer interviewed by
Mike Adams, Natural News Editor, said "that's so un-American to
say hey, you're going to stay in this box, and you can never grow
your business bigger than that. $500,000 [in revenue] is your
cap."l 57 He told Mr. Adams that his farm was actually halting
plans for expansion as a result of the FSMA "because we don't
want to get too successful."15 8
An example of a small, local food facility (packer and
distributor) that has gross revenues just above $500,000 is the
Appalachian Harvest Network, which brings local farms together
under a common brand and into a distribution system with major
retailers and grocers in the region. 159 With total revenue at
155. Id.
156. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec.
103(a), § 418(1)(1)(C)(ii)(II), 124 Stat. 3885, 3892 (2011).
157. Mike Adams, How the Food Safety Modernization Act will Destroy
American Jobs, Farms and Local Foods, NATURALNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://www.naturalnews.com/z030986_food-safetyfarmers.html.
158. Id.
159. Michael Shuman, et. al., APPALACHIAN HARVEST NETWORK,
COMMUNITY FOOD ENTERPRISE 44 (2009), http://www.communityfoodenter
prise.org/book-pdfs/CFE%20-%20appalachian-harvest-network-view.pdf.
At the heart of [Appalachian Harvest Network's] business model is
... a "buyers' matrix"-independent health food stores, local grocers,
and regional chains that are the main purchasers of AHN's produce.
This weekly process of assessing demand begins in the late fall and
carries through the winter. Every week AHN "plans and pools
production to meet demand": it assembles a list of buyers' requests,
shares the information with its growers, and then recruits local
growers to meet these demands. Wherever necessary, it offers direct
technical support and training to growers so that they get the proper
seeds, plant their fields properly, get organic certification, and fulfill
the buyers' requirements for high quality. Participating farmers
then bring their harvest to the AHN certified organic packing and
grading facility, where the produce is washed, packaged and readied
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$515,000, and over half of its sales to wholesalers and
distributors, Appalachian Harvest Network does not fall within
the Tester-Hagan Amendment's exemption but is "operat[ing] on a
tight budget with slim margins, leaving them especially
vulnerable to periods of economic downturn," or to burdensome
regulations that would require allocating time, money, and energy
to paperwork, equipment upgrades, and creating HARCP plans. 160
It is unfortunate that an enterprise that has created a system to
assist small, local farmers while providing good, healthy food in an
environmentally sustainable manner will be threatened by the
over-burdensome requirements of the FSMA.
2. Tester-Hagan Pros & Cons
The Tester-Hagan Amendment adopted in the final legislation
of the FSMA, as detailed in Part II.B, is an important protection
for small-scale food producers. It insulates qualifying facilities
and farms from the HARCP requirements and produce safety
standards, but does not go far enough to mitigate the effects of
legislation that otherwise does not differentiate in regard to scale.
The significant achievements of the Tester-Hagan Amendment are
that it provides an exemption for small facilities and farms; it
clarifies the definition of "retail food establishments," specifically
stating that "direct sales" include roadside stands, farmer's
markets, and CSAs; it includes flexibility and guidance for small
entities; and it requires the FDA to "conduct a study of the food
processing sector" by evaluating food production and health risks
in relation to size, type, product value, and scale and to use the
results of that study to ultimately define the terms "small
business" and "very small business."1 61 The drawbacks of the
Tester-Hagan Amendment are its limited threshold for
qualification; the discretionary nature of the withdrawal
provision; and its failure to address geographical differences in
for sale. AHN goes back to the buyers to let them know what is
available and when. Once the orders are finalized, it delivers the
fresh produce directly to the retailers' centralized delivery docks.
Some of the retailers redistribute the product to their own sites via
their own networks.
Id.
160. See id. at 44, 47.
161. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), § 418(1).
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scale. 162
Once ubiquitous in American society, small farms serving
local needs are having a renaissance in American culture that the
Tester-Hagan Amendment protects. "The growing trend toward
healthy, fresh, locally sourced vegetables, fruit, dairy, and value-
added products improves food safety by providing the opportunity
for consumers to know their farmers and processors, to choose
products on the basis of that relationship, and to readily trace any
problems should they occur."1 63  Consumers choosing local food
often buy it directly from the farm, at roadside stands, at farmer's
markets, or participate in CSA programs. Local and state
authorities (not to mention existing federal laws) already regulate
these local methods of supplying consumers with food. 164 Sparing
them from further federal oversight and regulations, which
translates into higher costs, not only protects their financial
viability but allows them to be more responsive to local and
community needs, which can differ from region to region. The
study of the food processing sector that the FDA is mandated to
conduct and report is a unique achievement because it will "foster
the development of multiple climate-, scale- and market-
appropriate models for promoting safe and healthy food in a sector
of the farm economy largely ignored heretofore by research
institutions."1 6 5  Researchers conducting the study will have an
opportunity to closely examine the "unique conditions of small and
diversified farming operations" while enabling the FDA to define
the terms "small business" and "very small business."1 66 It is
hoped that the government will recognize the impact and safety
aspects of small, local farms provided it has the opportunity and
funding to conduct a meaningful study.
Unfortunately the Tester-Hagan Amendment did not go far
enough. The $500,000 threshold leaves out many farms and
facilities that would consider themselves "small" and does not
recognize offsetting factors such as expenditures and types of
commodities. While it appears Congress recognized the need to
add the words "adjusted for inflation," it did not add wording that
162. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(1)-(3).
163. MacDonald & McGeary, supra note 19.
164. Id.
165. McReynolds, supra note 143.
166. See id.
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considered offsetting factors that may belie the size of a farm or
facility with sales over $500,000. 167 Ideally this shortcoming will
be resolved after the FDA conducts the required study. 168 Even
though qualifying facilities are theoretically exempt from the
HARCP requirements, they must still prove to the FDA, with
documentation, that they have identified hazards associated with
their food production, are implementing controls to address the
hazards, and are monitoring the controls. 169  This additional
requirement to establish exemptions seems contradictory because
it essentially requires them to have an informal HARCP system.
While they may opt out of this requirement by submitting
documentation proving compliance with non-federal food safety
laws, both options nonetheless impose requirements that could be
burdensome for very small operations, and the second option
leaves some discretion to the FDA as to which evidence of
compliance will be acceptable.1 70 As with the $500,000 threshold,
this hurdle might also be minimized after the FDA defines the
terms "small business" and "very small business."l71
The discretionary withdrawal provision that allows the FDA
to withdraw an exemption in the event of an active investigation
directly linked to the exempted facility or a determination by the
FDA that it is necessary to protect the public health leaves quite a
bit of room for the FDA to choose to withdraw an exemption if its
analysis of the type of operation leads it to consider the facility a
threat to public health.172 Therefore, as discussed further infra
Part III.C, a small facility otherwise meeting the qualifications for
exemption may still not be exempted if it is not in accord with
FDA policies for food safety.
Finally, the Tester-Hagan Amendment does not accommodate
differences in scale related to geography and market availability.
"[A] small farm in California is a massive farm in New England,
and $200,000 worth of cabbage comes from a much different-sized
operation than $200,000 of artisanal cheese."' 73 Additionally, a
167. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(1)(C)(ii)(II).
168. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(5).
169. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(2)(B)(i)(I).
170. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(2)(B)(i)(II).
171. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(5)(B).
172. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(3)(A).
173. Patty Lovera, Comment to Will the Food Safety Modernization Act
Harm Small Farms or Producers?, supra note 142.
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small facility located in a remote region may have little
opportunity for direct sales and have to sell more than half of its
products through a third-party or at a distance greater than 275
miles, thus curtailing its opportunity for exemption under section
103.174 Both sections 103 and 105 do direct the FDA to provide
"flexibility" for "small businesses,"1 75 but the long list of "highly
prescriptive and specific requirements . . . contradict the
'flexibility."'
76
Overall, the Tester-Hagan Amendment is a positive addition
to the FS1VA and much of its practical application for preserving
small farms will depend on the outcome of the mandated study.177
C. Too Bad: Agency Discretion
The notion of agency discretion has been alluded to
throughout this article and is a subject for further analysis
because the realities of this new legislation have not yet been
realized, and the inherent speculation of its impact on food safety
is largely dependent on one's perspective of government decision-
making. However, as this section further explores, after
considering the FDA's history of persecution of alternative food
producers, skewed priorities, revolving-door hiring policy, and lack
of understanding of the specific needs of small farmers, it is
apparent that the FSMA grants too much discretion to an
unreliable and untrustworthy agency. This section will focus on
the discretionary aspects of the FSMA, a brief history of the FDA's
use of its discretion, and the policies and goals the FDA intends to
pursue.
Throughout the FS1A there are numerous provisions that
leave key decisions to the discretion of the FDA. Part of the
trouble with analyzing the legislation, as well as the controversy
174. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(4)(B).
175. Id. sec. 103(a), § 418(n)(3)(A); sec. 105(a), 419(a)(3)(A).
176. MacDonald & McGeary, supra note 19 (discussing a specific example
of an FDA regulation that is not flexible and does not protect small business
and diversified farms by requiring vegetation-free buffer zones and protections
against wildlife that are not scientifically proven to increase food safety and
that contradict sustainable practices of these diversified farms).
177. The FSMA requires the FDA to submit the results of this study to
Congress within 18 months of the act's enactment. FDA Food Safety
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, sec. 103(a), § 418(l)(5), 124 Stat.
3885, 3894 (2011).
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surrounding its passage through Congress, 7 8 is that much of the
language is vague, many of its effects depend on its interpretation
and implementation, and many of the standards have yet to be
defined or promulgated. Citizen concern over agency discretion is
not without merit. Because federal agency's decisions are given
great deference and reviewed using the Chevron standard, 179
there is little recourse for challenging a decision so long as it was
based in reason. For the purposes of this article, this section will
briefly discuss several instances of vague, discretionary language
within the FSMA to illustrate the wide latitude granted to the
FDA that may disproportionally impact small and mid-sized
farms.
The ultimate determination of the definition of the terms
"small business" and "very small business" rests with the FDA
after it receives the results of the study described in section
103(a), creating section 418(1)(5)(A). While the FDA is constrained
by the language requiring it to consider "harvestable acres,
income, the number of employees, and the volume of food
harvested," 80 the weight given to each factor, and whether to
consider other factors when actually defining those terms, is left to
the FDA. This is a significant power because this determines
which facilities must comply with the HARCP requirements and
which ones may qualify for an exemption without having to meet
the threshold standards in section 103(a).
The change to section 207 is an example of intentionally
providing the FDA with additional discretionary authority for the
administrative detention of food by replacing a stricter standard
178. See Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009 - 2010)
H.R.2751CRS Summary, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?dlll:HR2751:@@@D&summl& (last visited May 21, 2012)(offering a neutral view of the passage of the FSMA); see also The "Food
Safety" Saga: Our Job Is Just Beginning, ALLIANCE FOR NATURAL HEALTH
(Jan. 4, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.anh-usa.org/the-food-safety-saga-our-job-
is-just-beginning/ (offering a somewhat biased view of the complicated
passage of the FSMA).
179. Agency interpretations on an ambiguous statute that the agency has
been charged with administering are given deference by reviewing courts.
See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding
that if a "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute").
180. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), § 418(1)(5)(B).
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for quarantine of "credible evidence" with a looser one: "reason to
believe."' 8 ' The FDA may now impound food based on a hunch
that it may be dangerous. This relaxed standard may be helpful
in situations where food was intentionally poisoned but could
easily be abused for reasons other than food safety. Similarly, the
potential for abuse is inherent in the articulated standard for the
mandatory recall authority of section 206, which allows the FDA
to offer the responsible party an "opportunity to cease distribution
and recall such article" based on a "reasonable probability that an
article of food .. . is adulterated . .. or misbranded .. . and the use
of or exposure to such article will cause serious adverse health
consequences or death to humans or animals."1 82  Relatively
benign labeling issues, like the one that prompted kombucha
producers to voluntarily recall their beverages from stores
nationwide during the summer of 2010 because of potential
disparities in the actual alcohol content and that labeled, may now
be strictly enforced by the FDA.1 83
181. See supra Part II.A.4.
182. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 206(a), § 423(a).
183. To consider the substance of the following news report to constitute a
risk of "serious adverse health consequences or death" is patently ridiculous,
and even more so when considering that the kombucha sold in stores was not
even the same home-brewed kombucha that the FDA was worried about.
Furthermore, it is an example of the FDA imposing mainstream beliefs about
what does and does not have health benefits:
"Kombucha is not currently regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, except for alcohol content. However, the Treasury
Department issued a statement when the product was pulled saying
that the alcohol levels found in certain products were high enough
for it to be taxed as an alcoholic beverage and require new labeling."
Mitch Lipka, Kombucha Tea After the Recall: It's Back and Still
Controversial, DAILY FINANCE (Aug. 5, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.daily
finance.com/2010/08/05/kombucha-tea-after-the-recall-its-back-and-still-
controversial/.
"[T]he mainstream health community does not embrace Kombucha
tea. Quite the opposite. Mayo Clinic internist Dr. Brent Bauer warns
on the Mayo Clinic web site that 'it's prudent to avoid it' given the
lack [sic] evidence to support health claims and more evidence to
suggest it can cause 'harm.' 'The Food and Drug Administration
cautions that the risk of contamination is high because Kombucha
tea is often brewed in homes under nonsterile conditions,' Bauer
writes. 'Lead poisoning also may be a risk if ceramic pots are used
for brewing - the acids in the tea may leach lead from the ceramic
glaze."'
923
924 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:887
Another example of FDA discretion embedded in the FSMA is
the "sufficient flexibility to be practicable for all sizes and types of
facilities, including small businesses" that the FDA is required to
provide in promulgating "science-based minimum standards for
conducting [the] hazard analysis, documenting hazards,
implementing preventative controls, and documenting the
implementation of the preventative controls" in section 103.184
Further factors that shape this rulemaking are contained in
section 103(a), such as acknowledging differences in risk,
minimizing the separate standards applied to separate foods, and
not forcing companies to hire consultants, but again, these rules
will ultimately be determined by the FDA with few enforceable
limitations. 185 There is, as with most agency rulemaking, a public
comment period, but an agency is not required, unless specifically
required by statute, to change its regulations or adopt any portion
of the public's comments. 186  For example, the "FDA has
repeatedly approved genetically modified foods without labeling
despite significant public opposition." 8 7
In fact, as the FSMA provides the FDA with quite a bit of
expanded authority to inspect records upon a "reasonable belie[fl"
of a "reasonable probability" of serious risk under section 101 and
to establish science-based minimum produce safety standards and
good agricultural practices based under section 105, the remaining
questions are, who is the FDA and what food safety goals does it
wish to pursue?
The FDA is a federal agency within the executive branch of
the U.S. government. The commissioner, Dr. Margaret Hamburg,
Id.
184. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103(a), § 418(n).
185. Id.
186. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (directing
an agency to provide a public comment period but not requiring an agency to
adopt those comments); see also Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("An agency need not address
every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned manner to those that raise
significant problems."); Athens Cmty. Hosp. v. Heckler, 565 F. Supp. 695, 699
(E.D. Tenn. 1983) (an agency "need not respond to all specific issues raised in
comments on a proposed rule," but the response "must be sufficient for [a
court] to determine whether the [agency] considered the relevant factors in
reaching the final decision").
187. Judith McGeary, Comment to Does the Food Safety Bill Give the FDA
Too Much Power-or Not Enough?, supra note 92.
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was nominated by President Obama and confirmed by the Senate
on May 18, 2009.188 "[S]he is an experienced medical doctor,
scientist, and public health executive."1 89 More relevant is the
Deputy Commissioner for Foods, Michael R. Taylor, who Dr.
Hamburg appointed to a new position that she created in August
2009 to "develop and carry out a prevention-based strategy for
food safety" and "plan for new food safety legislation" 190:
The new Office of Foods is responsible, on behalf of the
Commissioner, for providing all elements of FDA's Foods
Program leadership, guidance, and support to achieve the
Agency's public health goals. The Office is also the focal
point for planning implementation of the
recommendations of the President's Food Safety Working
Group and the new food safety authorities being
considered by Congress.191
Therefore, Mr. Taylor, former vice president for public policy of
Monsanto, former administrator of USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service and acting under secretary for food safety at
USDA, former partner at King & Spalding law firm, and former
staff attorney at the FDA,192 is the authority whose discretion
matters. The point of highlighting Mr. Taylor's career is to
illustrate the inherent industry bias of this top official tasked with
the final determination of discretionary agency decisions. 193




190. Meet Michael R. Taylor, J.D., Deputy Commissioner for Foods, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/
OfficeofFoods/ucm196721.htm (last updated Apr. 23, 2010).
191. Office of Foods: Overview and Mission, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofFoods/ucml96720.h
tm (last updated Jan. 11, 2010).
192. Meet Michael R. Taylor, J.D., Deputy Commissioner for Foods, supra
note 190.
193. Of course his appointment also reflects the "revolving door" policy so
prevalent in federal agencies that permits leaders of industry to occupy
prominent roles at the very agencies regulating their industry. This prime
example of a "fox watching the henhouse," has generated a good deal of
controversy and has culminated in a petition for his removal with more than
430,000 signatures. See Elizabeth Flock, Monsanto Petition Tells Obama:
'Cease FDA Ties to Monsanto', BLOGPOST (Jan. 30, 2012, 11:27 AM),
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Although some of the discretionary decisions highlighted below
were pursued by the FDA prior to his appointment, Mr. Taylor
nevertheless represents the agency's adherence to the current
mainstream, one-size-fits-all, industrial approach to food
production, and therefore its approach to food safety. 194
An examination of some recent instances in which the FDA
has exercised its authority reveals its preferences and policies for
controlling food safety. The current trend of enforcement by the
FDA against farmstead dairies is an ominous indicator of where
the FDA wants to go. For example, on April 20, 2010, two FDA
agents, two federal marshals, and one state trooper went to the
Rainbow Acres farm in Pennsylvania at 5 a.m. "to execute an
administrative search warrant," ultimately fining the farm-owner
for violating a law against selling raw milk.195 The FDA has
targeted twenty different buying clubs in Chicago suspected of
obtaining raw milk from out-of-state sources and "has a similar
strategy for the states, with the plan being to pressure one state
at a time to ban raw milk sales."l 96  Morningland Dairy, a
farmstead raw milk cheese operation in Missouri, has been
involved in litigation for over a year, and has had approximately
29,000 pounds of its cheese impounded since August 26, 2010,
even though there have been no reported illnesses from
consumption of its products throughout the thirty years it has
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/monsanto-petition-tells-
obama-cease-fda-ties-to-monsanto/2012/01/30/gIQAA9dZcC-blog.html;
Frederick Ravid, Tell Obama to Cease FDA Ties to Monsanto, SIGNON.ORG(last visited Apr. 1, 2012), http://signon.org/sign/tell-obama-to-cease-
fda.fbl?source=s.fb&r by-2105328.
194. See Endres & Tarr, supra note 150 ("Critics fear [Taylor] will
institute policies that indirectly harm small business by failing to take into
account the unique needs of such entities in favor of adopting a one-size-fits-
all (and that one-size is big business) approach."); McReynolds, supra note
143 ("[T]he corporate giants that dominate the fresh produce industry . . .
cannot conceive of the means for managing contamination issues in the local
food sector. Those agribusiness behemoths' only frames of reference are their
own capital-intensive, compliance department-managed, standardized, large-
scale operations. From their perspective, the realities of low-input, owner-
manned and-operated, diversified, small-scale operations are
unfathomable.").
195. Pete Kennedy, FDA Steps Up Enforcement Against Raw Milk, THE
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been in business. 197 The list of recalls, suspensions, and
enforcement actions against raw milk products goes on and on
even though there is not yet a federal prohibition of raw milk.'98
The zero tolerance policy on Listeria monocytogenes, a foodborne
pathogen that can sometimes be virulent, threatens to eliminate
raw milk artisanal cheese production, and thus cut out a
significant high-value niche for small and mid-sized farming
operations. 199
197. Pete Kennedy, Morningland Cheese Trial, FARM-TO-CONSUMER
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.farmtoconsumer.org/
morningland-cheese-trial-kennedy.htm.
Recently, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has pressured farmstead cheesemakers in Washington state and
Missouri into recalling thousands of pounds of cheese due to samples
testing positive for L-mono even though in neither case was there a
single report of foodborne illness blamed on the farmstead
operations. Compared to the raw milk incidents . . . , the stakes are
much higher [for cheesemakers]. Unlike the raw milk producers who
can only sell in their own states due to the federal interstate ban,
raw milk cheese aged at least sixty days can be sold anywhere in the
U.S. and has a longer shelf life, meaning a great deal more money
can be lost due to a recall.
Pete Kennedy, FDA's Ace in the Hole, FARM-TO-CONSUMER LEGAL DEFENSE
FUND (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.farmtoconsumer.org/fda-ace-in-the-hole-
kennedy.htm.
198. See e.g., Pete Kennedy, Summary of Raw Milk Statutes and
Administrative Codes, A CAMPAIGN FOR REAL MILK, (Dec. 1, 2004)
http://www.realmilk.com/milk-laws-1.html (compiling a summary of state
laws on raw milk). For further information and numerous articles regarding
FDA enforcement and litigation over raw milk products, see generally FARM-
TO-CONSUMER LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.farmtoconsumer.org (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011); FOOD SAFETY NEWS PRESENTED BY MARLER CLARK LLP,
PS, http://www.foodsafetynews.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2011); FOOD
FREEDOM, http://foodfreedom.wordpress.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2011); A
CAMPAIGN FOR REAL MILK, http://www.realmilk.com (last visited Sept. 12,
2011); THE WESTON A. PRICE FOUNDATION, http://www.westonaprice.org (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011).
199. It should be noted that
There are many subtypes of Listeria monocytogenes; many of
these subtypes have not been implicated in human illness. There are
laboratories in the U.S. that have the capability to identify the
subtype of L-mono in a food after the initial test for that bacteria is
positive. What is happening is that FDA and state agencies are just
relying on the initial positive test for L-mono without doing further
testing to determine if the subtype is one that has actually caused
illness in humans. If the L-mono subtype found in a food has not
caused illness in humans, then the food is not adulterated and there
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Even seemingly innocuous products, like walnuts and
cherries, are not immune from being targeted by the FDA for
making "false" health claims.2 00 In 2006, the FDA demanded that
twenty-nine cherry producers stop making claims that their
products were healthy, and in 2010, the FDA threatened an attack
against a large walnut producer to remove health claims on their
website and marketing materials. 201 Even though both claims
were backed up by scientific evidence, the FDA does not allow
health claims about treating or preventing disease without its
prior approval, because such claims would categorize the product
as a "drug."202  However, health claims made on Frito-Lay's
website have not received the same, if any, attention from the
FDA.203
Furthermore, the FDA has not banned chemical pesticides
and fertilizers known to cause cancer, 204 nor did the FSMA
include regulations on the use of bisphenol-A (commonly used in
plastic beverage containers and known as BPA), a well-known
health risk that Senator Diane Feinstein pushed to be banned.205
The priorities of the FDA seem to be askew. When the President's
Cancer Panel advises changing the paradigm from presuming
chemicals are safe until strong evidence emerges to the contrary,
should be no product recall since the detected L-mono poses no risk
of illness or injury. ...
Even if the subtype of L-mono is virulent, it still needs to be
determined whether the amount of bacteria in the food is enough to
cause illness in humans. FDA has a "zero" tolerance policy for L-
mono, a standard widely rejected by the scientific community
throughout the world. The European Union (EU) allows up to 100
organisms per gram in food at the end of its shelf life.
FDA's Ace in the Hole, supra note 197.
200. Mike Adams, Health Products Under Fire as FDA Attacks Walnuts,






204. See supra part III.A.5.
205. See PRESIDENT'S CANCER PANEL, supra note 123, at 18; Kristof, supra
note 125; see also Marla Cone, President's Cancer Panel: Environmentally
Caused Cancers Are 'Grossly Underestimated' and 'Needlessly Devastate
American Lives,' ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NEWS (May 6, 2010),
http://www.environmentalhealthnews.org/ehs/news/presidents-cancer-panel.
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to presuming they are dangerous until proven safe,206 the FDA,
charged with protecting food safety and setting agricultural
standards, ought to pay attention. It is especially irresponsible
and indicative of the heavy influence of big industry that the
President's Cancer Panel report was released nine months before
the enactment of the FS1IA. Thus, it is reasonable to be afraid of
the discretionary authority afforded to the FDA by the FSMA.
When the FDA states in a legal brief on public record that "there
is no generalized right to bodily and physical health" and "there is
no absolute right to consume or feed children any particular
food,"207 its food safety and health policies become highly
suspicious.
Congress was correct to recognize that U.S. food safety
regulations were in dire need of a massive overhaul. However,
both Congress and the President missed the mark by enlisting
personnel like Michael R. Taylor, who represent the very industry
creating the greatest risks and in need of the most stringent
regulations, to set forth the guidelines and criteria for a revised
food-safety regime. Instead of writing legislation with a one-size-
fits-all approach, Congress ought to have focused its efforts on the
large agribusinesses creating the risks and left small and mid-
sized operations to state regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
We are what we eat, and our health and nutrition depend on
the consumption of nutritious, high-vitamin foods. Food is human
sustenance and is the fundamental prerequisite to life. Its
production must be transparent and its producers held
accountable. What is truly needed is a paradigm shift from our
206. See PRESIDENT'S CANCER PANEL, supra note 123, at 103.
207. Brief in Support of United States' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint at 25-26, Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund v.
Sebelius, Secretary, No. C 10-4018-MWB (N.D. Iowa Apr. 26, 2010) ECF No.
11-1. Admittedly, these statements were made as part of a legal argument
attempting to lower the level of judicial scrutiny over challenged FDA
regulations, which prohibited the sale or distribution in interstate commerce
of unpasteurized milk and milk products for human consumption.
Nevertheless, it is disconcerting that the entity charged with protecting
Americans' "bodily and physical health" can even make a legal argument
suggesting we have no right to choose our food, nor have a fundamental right
to "bodily and physical health." Id.
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dependence on industrialized food to an increased reliance on local
and sustainably grown food rather than further government
regulation. Local food can be defined by the proximal relationship
between production and consumption 208 but is better understood
by examining the "producer's and consumer's motivations for
buying and selling local food: '1) a sense of connection, 2) quality,
3) environmental impact, and 4) political and social support for a
particular type of agriculture."'209 Local food may be safer because
it is sold fresh and therefore does not require preservatives, or
storage and transportation. 210 "[I]t is usually sold unprocessed
[and] has come in contact with fewer hands and
mechanization."211 The local producer is directly accountable to
its local consumer because the local consumer knows exactly
where and when he purchased a particular product from the local
producer, and can easily express any dissatisfaction directly to the
producer or to the surrounding community.
It is not coincidental that the rise in food-related illnesses has
accompanied the "rise of industrial agriculture and food
production,"212 and the current rate of outbreaks reflects our over-
dependence on an increasingly concentrated food production
system. 213 The resulting concern for food safety has led us to
adopting "'clean farming' practices, which ironically run directly
counter to farming practices developed by sustainable farmers
with human health and the larger healthy functioning of the food
production system in mind."214 Our definition of what is a health
risk must be re-examined. For example, raw milk cheese may
pose a serious health risk if produced by a large, industrial
208. While it is clear that the proximal relationship must be a relatively
short distance between the producer and the consumer, there is no specific
definition for local food, and no specific geographic requirement. Any specific
requirement would be problematic because of the inherent differences and
relativity of size and scale within the United States.
209. Nathan M. Trexler, Note, "Market" Regulation: Confronting
Industrial Agriculture's Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 337-
38 (2011).
210. Id. at 338.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 337.
213. Mrill Ingram, Keeping up with the E. Coli: Considering Human-
Nonhuman Relationships in Natural Resources Policy, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J.
371, 374-75 (2010).
214. Id. at 375.
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facility, while it may be nutritionally advantageous 215 and
perfectly safe if it is produced by a small, local facility. Congress
must recognize that broad, sweeping legislation like the FSMA
does not account for the different risks posed by varying sized food
production facilities - namely that it does too little to be effective
in mitigating risks posed by larger facilities, it is too broad to
accommodate the needs of smaller facilities, and in reality, it does
little to actually protect consumers. Consumers would be better
served by more stringent regulations of large business, defined by
market share, and government funded compliance for those
businesses that occupy only a minor share of the market. The
government's role with respect to food safety, health, and
nutrition should be to regulate large-scale food production
operations while leaving consumers the choice to determine for
themselves what is healthy and safe when buying from their local
farm.
215. The live enzymes in raw milk aid human digestion of sugars, fats,
and minerals. Id. at 379.
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